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Living Off the Walled Garden: Abusing the Features of the Early Launch Antimalware Ecosystem

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Who protects the protector?

Introduction to ELAM and PPL

Information Classification: General



Previous work - Everything is derivative



Information Classification: General



Thank you James and Alex!



Protected Process Light Protections

- Designed to prevent tampering in user-mode, even as admin.
- Cannot start or stop protected processes
- Cannot get a handle to a protected process
- Cannot attach a debugger to a protected process
- To run protected, an executable must meet specific signing requirements.



Early Launch AntiMalware (ELAM) Drivers

- Microsoft's supported 3rd party security product anti-tampering mechanism.
- Specifies certificate hashes allowed to run at the Antimalware-Light PPL protection level
- "Microsoft requires that Early Launch Antimalware vendors be members of the Microsoft Virus Initiative (MVI)."
- Vendors must pass the WHQL driver submission.



Enumerating installed ELAM drivers

PS C:\Users\TestUser\Desktop> Get-CimInstance Win32_LoadOrderGroup -Filter 'Name = "Early-launch"' Get-CimAssociatedInstance -Association Win32_LoadOrderGroupServiceMembers | Select-Object -Prop erty Name, Description, PathName

Description Name

PathName

WdBoot Microsoft Defender Antivirus Boot Driver C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\wd\WdBoot.sys





Early Launch Antimalware (ELAM) Driver Hashes

- Certificate hashes are To-Be-Signed (TBS) hashes.
- TBS hash is not the same as a Thumbprint!
- Tools to calculate TBS hash:
 - certmgr.exe (Windows SDK)
 - Get-TBSHash
- VirusTotal doesn't understand TBS hashes...





ELAM Driver Signer Resource

```
MicrosoftElamCertificateInfo MSElamCertInfoID
```

```
1
       3, // count of entries
       L''CertHash1 \setminus 0'',
       Algorithm,
       L''EKU1 \setminus 0'',
       L''CertHash2 \setminus 0'',
       Algorithm,
       L'' \setminus 0'', //No EKU for cert hash 2
       L''CertHash3 \setminus 0'',
       Algorithm,
       L"EKU3a;EKU3b;EKU3c\0", //multiple EKU entries supported (max: 3)
```

```
Protecting anti-malware services
```





An Example Parsed ELAM Ruleset - WdBoot.sys

• Allow Rule #1

SignerHash:

f6f717a43ad9abddc8cefdde1c505462535e7d1307e630f9544a2d14fe8bf26e

SignerHashAlgorithm: SHA256

SignerEKUs: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.76.8.1; 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.76.11.1

• Allow Rule #2

SignerHash:

4e80be107c860de896384b3eff50504dc2d76ac7151df3102a4450637a032146

SignerHashAlgorithm: SHA256

SignerEKUs: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.76.8.1;1.3.6.1.4.1.311.76.11.1






PS C:\Users\TestUser\Desktop> \$DefenderExe = Get-SystemDriver -ScanPath .\Defender -UserPEs -NoSha dowCopy PS C:\Users\TestUser\Desktop> \$DefenderExe[0].Signers[1].Chain.ChainElements[1].Certificate Thumbprint Subject CN=Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2011, O=Microsoft Corp... F252E794FE438E35ACE6E53762C0A234A2C52135 PS C:\Users\TestUser\Desktop> \$DefenderExe[0].Signers[1].Chain.ChainElements[1].Certificate | Get-TBSHash F6F717A43AD9ABDDC8CEFDDE1C505462535E7D1307E630F9544A2D14FE8BF26E





MsMpEng.exe	Properties		×	Certificate	
Security General Signature list	Details Compatibility	Previous Versions Digital Signatures		Seneral Details Certification P	ath V
	er: Digest algorithm pora sha1 pora sha256	Timestamp Friday, February 22, 2 Friday, February 22, 2		Field Valid to Subject Public key Public key parameters	Value Friday, Septe Microsoft Cor RSA (2048 Bi 05 00
		Details		Enhanced Key Usage Subject Key Identifier Subject Alternative Name Authority Key Identifier	Unknown Key 97420b8011: Directory Add KeyID=486e
				Unknown Key Usage (1.3.6.1.4 Microsoft Publisher (1.3.6.1.4.1 Code Signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3	.311.76.8.1)







[Admin] PS	6 C:\Users	\TestUser\I	Desktop>	Get-Pro	cess	-Name I	MsMpEng	Get-Proce
ProcessId	ProcessNa	ne	Туре	Sig	ner			
2092	MsMpEng.ex	ke Protect	edLight /	Antimalw	are			
[Admin] PS	6 C:\Users	\TestUser\I	Desktop>	Get-Cim	ıInsta	ance Wi	132_Serv	ice -Filter
ProcessId	Name	StartMode	State	Status	Exit	Code		
2092	WinDefend	Auto	Running	ок	Θ			



essProtectionLevel


'ProcessId = 2092'



Set001\Services\WinDefend		
Name	Туре	Data
(Default)	REG_SZ	(value not set)
DependOnService	REG_MULTI_SZ	RpcSs
ab Description	REG_SZ	@%ProgramFiles%\Windows Defender\MpAsDesc.dll,-240
赴 DisplayName	REG_SZ	@%ProgramFiles%\Windows Defender\MpAsDesc.dll,-310
🔀 ErrorControl	REG_DWORD	0x0000001 (1)
3 FailureActions	REG_BINARY	80 51 01 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 01 00
ab ImagePath	REG_EXPAND_SZ	"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\4.1
🕫 LaunchProtected	REG_DWORD	0x0000003 (3)
ab ObjectName	REG_SZ	LocalSystem

PsProtectedSignerAntimalware = 0n3







ELAM is an allowlist for Antimalware-Light PPL process execution. What if the allowlist is overly permissive?



ELAM Driver Hunting and Auditing

Information Classification: General





Hunting for ELAM drivers

VirusTotal search:

signature: "Microsoft Windows Early Launch Anti-malware Publisher"

tag:native tag:signed tag:peexe

not tag:invalid-signature



FILES 20/886



Additional ELAM driver validation

- Confirm the ELAM driver has a valid signature
- The name of the leaf certificate is "Microsoft Windows Early Launch Anti-malware Publisher"
- The driver has a MSELAMCERTINFOID resource consisting of a parsed signer allow list.
- 866 ➡ 766 unique ELAM drivers



Identified ELAM Vendors

- **Microsoft Corporation**
- McAfee, LLC
- VMware, Inc.
- **Total Defense, Inc.**
- COMODO
- **Broadcom Corporation**
- CrowdStrike, Inc.
- Bitdefender
- **AO Kaspersky Lab**
- **ESET**
- AVG Technologies CZ, s.r.o.
- **AVAST Software**
- **Cisco Systems, Inc.**
- AhnLab, Inc.
- Windows (R) Win 7 DDK provider
- **F-Secure Corporation**
- Trend Micro Inc.
- **Carbon Black, Inc.**
- **K7** Computing Pvt Ltd
- **Sophos Limited**
- **ESTsecurity Corp.**

	• Panda Security, S.L.	• Webroot
	Malwarebytes	Reason C
	Broadcom	• Hammoo
	 Avira Operations GmbH & Co. KG 	Sentinel
	• 360.cn	 Beijing R
	Doctor Web, Ltd.	SecureTr
	• Beijing Rising Network Security Technology Co., Ltd.	• Fidelis Cy
	Cynet Security Ltd	• Faronics
	TODO: <company name=""></company>	• IObit
	Fortinet Inc	VIPRE Se
	IKARUS Security Software GmbH	• Emsisoft
	• Beijing Huorong Network Technology Co., Ltd.	SecureIT
	ThreatTrack Security, Inc.	 Rising
	Acronis International GmbH	• TG Soft -
	BullGuard Ltd.	MicroWo
ſ	Arcabit/mks_vir	Avira Op
	• FireEye, Inc.	• Wontok,
	Check Point Software Technologies	• TeamVie
	Symantec Corporation	• enSilo
	 Quick Heal Technologies Ltd. 	AdAware
	· 电脑管家	• TeamVie
	G DATA Software AG	• G DATA (

- t
- **CyberSecurity Inc.**
- ck Corporation
- lOne, Inc.
- rust
- Cybersecurity
- **Corporation**
- ecurity
- t Ltd
- www.tgsoft.it
- orld Technologies Inc.
- perations GmbH
- , Inc
- ewer
- e
- ewer Germany GmbH
- G DATA CyberDefense AG

Rising Information Technology Co., Ltd.



ELAM Auditing Strategy


- Identify the corresponding certificate with the TBS hash.
- Search for EXEs and DLLs signed with that certificate in the chain.
- Identify signed code that might permit code execution.
- Low-hanging fruit: LOLbins?
- Install candidate executables as a protected service.



ELAM Auditing Challenges

- VirusTotal doesn't understand TBS hashes only Thumbprint
- You are lucky if there are any Google hits...

("f6f717	a43ad9abo	dc8cefdde1	c505462535e	e7d1307e630f9	544a2d14fe8bf26	\times
	Q AII	⊘ Maps	▶ Videos	🔝 Images	Shopping	: More	
	10 resul	ts (0.31 seco	nds)				





Associating TBS Hash to Thumbprint

• Sometimes you'll get lucky...

name: Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2011 issuer: Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2011 thumbprint: f252e794fe438e35ace6e53762c0a234a2c52135 signature hash: f6f717a43ad9abddc8cefdde1c505462535e7d1307e630f9544a2d14fe8bf26e

https://famellee.wordpress.com/2016/09/08/retrieve-digital-signatures-using-wintrust/



Hunting for Potential Protected Executables

Note: this particular rule has an EKU restriction...

- (Microsoft Publisher) • 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.76.8.1
- 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.76.11.1 (Microsoft AntiMalware)

signature:f252e794fe438e35ace6e53762c0a234a2c52135 tag:signed tag:peexe not tag:invalid-signature

FILES 20 / 171.79 K

Information Classification: General





Identified Overly-Permissive Allowed Signers

Leaf Certificates

- **Microsoft Corporation (Thumbprint:** B9EAA034C821C159B05D3521BCF7FEB796EBD6FF)
 - TBS: 84D8717A416C8C9E214C6E0DBD091860D8133E413BCEE35673998E27BBA084CA
- Microsoft Corporation (Thumbprint: 62009AAABDAE749FD47D19150958329BF6FF4B34)
 - TBS: E17764C39F2AFD7114F8528D2F9783D9A591F6679715EECE730A262CF5CFD3B3

Intermediate Certificates

- Symantec Class 3 SHA256 Code Signing CA (Thumbprint: 007790F6561DAD89B0BCD85585762495E358F8A5)
 - TBS: A08E79C386083D875014C409C13D144E0A24386132980DF11FF59737C8489EB1
- VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority G5 (Thumbprint: 495847a93187cfb8c71f840cb7b41497ad95c64f)
 - **TBS:** 4843A82ED3B1F2BFBEE9671960E1940C942F688D
- DigiCert Assured ID Code Signing CA-1 (Thumbprint: 409AA4A74A0CDA7C0FEE6BD0BB8823D16B5F1875)
 - **TBS:** 47F4B9898631773231B32844EC0D49990AC4EB1E



Identified Overly-Permissive Allowed Signers

sigr	nature:495847a93187cfb8c71f840cb7b41497ad95c64f tag:signed tag:peexe positives:40+ 🚋 Help	Q
		Detectio
	17DD6A69137979A0E2D69E92ECC406FBCACF949DB0D445229978D74E1DC4145C Solve No meaningful names peexe overlay runtime-modules signed checks-network-adapters long-sleeps direct-cpu-clock-access	51 / 6
	10D4182D6C4557DD731DDEFFC4E82D300CB54BAA73DE146ADF99E38DEADED23D	47 / 6

	1		
	₫₽	0	X
ions		Size	
69		228.78 KB	
69		1.54 MB	



Weaponization

Information Classification: General



Identifying a Candidate Abusable Executable

signature:62009AAABDAE749FD47D19150958329BF6FF4B34 name:"msbuild.exe" tag:signed tag:peexe not tag:invalid-signature					
$\square \stackrel{>}{\leftarrow}$ FILES 16/16					
6891DA439A64108CC7FD7CA27F14BD726844B20C084506C13681078F5D9A3768 © © MSBuild.exe peexe overlay runtime-modules signed detect-debug-environment long-sleeps direct-cpu-clock-access	64bits				



Weaponization Steps

- Register overly-permissive ELAM driver with InstallELAMCertificateInfo function in kernel32.dll.
- Create service for abusable executable (e.g. MSBuild)
- Specify service as SERVICE LAUNCH PROTECTED ANTIMALWARE LIGHT with ChangeServiceConfig2W
- Start service. Profit.



Weaponization Constraints

- Many "LOLBins" are likely not designed to run protected.
- PPL doesn't permit spawning a child process by default.
- Must permit arbitrary unsigned code execution
- MSBuild payloads spawn a child process by default.
 - Property functions don't spawn a child process!
 - Thank you, Casey Smith!



d. t.



MSBuild Weaponization Constraints

MSBuild Property Function payload must be implemented as a one-liner using pseudo-.NET syntax

```
<Project ToolsVersion="4.0"
xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
<Target Name="TestTarget">
<PropertyGroup>
<TestProperty>$([System.Activator]::CreateInstance($([System.Reflec
tion.Assembly]::Load($([System.Convert]::FromBase64String("REPLACEM
E"))).GetType("Test")))))</TestProperty>
</PropertyGroup>
</Target>
</Project>
```





Information Classification: General



Demo #1 – Running MSBuild Protected

https://youtu.be/-Pij0loMWA4

Information Classification: General







Demo #2 – Killing Defender AV Protected Process

https://youtu.be/i2aM7jGDZsw

Information Classification: General







Mitigations and Detection

Information Classification: General



Mitigations

- A robust fix from Microsoft in the future?
- WDAC blocks loading/execution of disallowed ELAM drivers.





Detection and Recommendations

Defenders

- Focus on antimalware-light service creation.
- HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SERVICE LaunchProtected 3

Vendors

- Use code-signing certificates with dedicated EKUs only for service executables and DLLs that are absolutely necessary.
- Perform an audit of ELAM rules and corresponding allowed binaries.





Conclusion

Information Classification: General



Why is this so bad?

- One overly permissive ELAM driver poisons the well across the entire 3rd party antimalware ecosystem.
- The vetting process for ELAM drivers is far from robust.
- Malware running as PPL
 - can kill security products
 - is afforded anti-tampering protection



Disclosure Timeline

- Dec 28, 2021 Reported to MSRC
- Jan 11, 2022
 - MSRC closed report. Reason: not a security boundary
 - Passed on report to Defender Research team
- January to Present
 - Defender mitigation developed/implemented for Microsoft-signers
 - Issue and mitigation communicated to MVI vendors and engagement with vendors 0 regarding affected ELAM drivers.
 - Communicated by us that scope extends beyond Microsoft-signers, making mitigation unviable.
 - Plan to treat overly-permissive ELAM drivers on an individual basis e.g. potential blocking in CI/ASR

Thank you, David Kaplan, Gil Besso, and Philip Tsukerman @ Microsoft!!!



Official Microsoft Response

"Microsoft researchers have been collaborating with Matt Graeber on the findings and with Microsoft Virus Initiative (MVI) partners to address the issue from their own ELAM drivers. Customers using both Microsoft Defender Antivirus and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint are covered by potential abuse of the ELAM functionality."





Resources

- Protecting anti-malware services
- ELAM Driver Requirements
- Unknown Known DLLs
- The Evolution of Protected Processes Parts 1, 2, and 3
- Building a WDAC Driver Allowlist





Code

- ELAM driver allow list parser Get-ElamCertInfo
- TBS hash calculator Get-TBSHash
- Defanged PPL Runner AntimalwareBlight
 - Bring your own MSBuild and overly-permissive ELAM driver.



Thanks!

Information Classification: General