Trace Me If You can: Bypassing Linux Syscall Tracing

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About Rex Guo

- Principal Engineer @ Lacework
  - Behavior anomaly detection (Polygraph)
  - CSPM
- Engineering Manager @ Startups
  - Confluera (XDR)
  - Tetration (CWPP, now part of Cisco)
- Conference speaker at Blackhat, DEFCON,…
- @Xiaofei_REX

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About Junyuan Zeng

- Linkedin
  - Senior Software Engineer: Kubernetes
- JD.com
  - Staff Security Architect/Engineer: Cloud native security
- Samsung Research America & FireEye
  - Staff Security Software Engineer/Researcher: Mobile security

An Incident - An Attacker's View

Log4shell RCE on joe-box and executed a reverse shell



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

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

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

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

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

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

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Detection Rule Example

rule: untrusted program reads */etc/shadow*

condition:

syscall == open(at)

and has read permission

and filename == */etc/shadow*

and program is not in allowlist

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Agenda

- Syscall Tracing
- Vulnerabilities
- Exploitations
- Mitigations
- Takeaways

System Call Tracing



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System Call Tracing – Tracing Program

- Tracing programs collect system call data, e.g., arguments
- Tracing programs can “attach” to different hooks
  - tracepoints, kprobe, ptrace etc.
- Tracing programs implementations
  - Linux native mechanisms: *ftrace*, *perf_events* etc.
  - Kernel modules, eBPF probe and user space programs

System Call Tracing – tracepoint

- tracepoint
  - Kernel static hook
  - Linux kernel provides *sys_enter* and *sys_exit*



  - Low overhead but only static interceptions

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System Call Tracing – kprobe

- kprobe
  - Dynamic hook in the kernel
  - Register tracing programs on instructions in syscall code path
  - Dynamic but slow compared to tracepoint and need to know exactly how data is placed on the stack and registers



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System Call Tracing – ptrace

- ptrace
  - A static hook
  - No Kernel Module/eBPF program are needed
  - Performance overhead is high
  - Can combine with seccomp to reduce overhead
- Others (LD_PRELOAD etc.)

Cloud Workloads

- Virtual machines
  - AWS EC2 instances
  - Google VM instances
- Containers on customer-managed VMs
  - AWS EC2 tasks
  - Standard GKE workloads (e.g. DaemonSet etc.)
  - AKS workloads
- Serverless containers: have no access to the host
  - AWS Fargate tasks
  - GCP Cloud Run services
- Others (AWS Lambda etc.)

System Call Tracing for Cloud Workloads

Workload	System Call Tracing
VMs	• Hooks: tracepoint, kprobe, ptrace • Tracing programs: kernel programs (eBPF, kernel Module), user programs • Tools: Falco eBPF/kernel Module, Falco pdig
Containers	• Hooks: tracepoint, kprobe, ptrace • Tracing programs: kernel programs (eBPF, kernel Module), user programs • Tools: Falco eBPF/kernel Module, Falco pdig
Serverless Containers	• Hooks: ptrace • Tracing programs: user programs • Tools: Falco pdig

Open Source Projects

- Falco
  - Open source endpoint security monitoring project in CNCF
  - 5K+ github stars
  - Falco supports syscall tracing techniques:
    - tracepoint + kernel module
    - tracepoint + eBPF probe
    - pdig: ptrace + userspace program
- Falco pdig
  - Support syscall tracing of serverless workloads

TOCTOU in Syscall Tracing

- *sys_connect(int fd, struct sockaddr __user * uservaddr, int addrlen)*
- TOC (Time-Of-Check): tracing programs dereference this user space pointer
- TOU (Time-Of-Use): the kernel dereferences this user space pointer

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TOCTOU - Connect



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

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

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


```
ptrace_report_syscall(regs, message)
__secure_computing(struct seccomp_data{regs…})
trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->orig_ax)
```

Syscall Table (x86_64)
…
42 sys_connect
43 sys_accept
44 sys_sendto
…

```
long __sys_connect((int fd,
        struct sockaddr __user *uservaddr, int addrlen))
{
    …
    struct filename *tmp;
    ret = move_addr_to_kernel
            (uservaddr, addrlen, &address);
    if (!ret)
      ret = __sys_connect_file
            (f.file, &address, addrlen, 0);

    …
}
```

```
trace_sys_exit(regs, regs->ax)
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Userspace pointer pointing to “socket address”

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TOCTOU - Connect




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trace_sys_exit(regs, regs->ax)
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Userspace pointer pointing to “socket address”

Kernel pointer pointing to “socket address”

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TOCTOU - Connect

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

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

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

TOCTOU - Connect

TOCTOU Windows across Kernels

- TOCTOU windows exist since the initial release of tracepoint/ptrace
- Expected behaviors
- Monitor kernel memory

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TOCTOU – Falco

- User space pointers are dereferenced by
  - *sys_exit* tracepoint (kernel module, eBPF)
  - *sys_exit* ptrace (pdig)
- Falco older than v0.31.1
  - Check with vendors which commercial versions are affected
- 12/06/2021 Issue reported (CVE-2022-26316)
- 03/11/2022 Mitigation implemented (Advisory)
  - For selected syscalls, compare sys_enter and sys_exit tracepoint data (Falco LKM, eBPF)
  - Compare sys_enter and sys_exit ptrace data (Falco pdig)

TOCTOU – Falco

- We evaluated the important syscalls in Falco rules.

Syscall	Category	TOCTOU?	Exploitable by blocking condition	Exploitable by DC29 attack
connect	Network	Y	Y	Y
sendto/sendmsg	Network	Y	N	Y
open(at)	File	Y	Y	Y
execve	File	N	N*	N*
rename	File	Y	Y	Y
renameat(2)	File	Y	Y	Y
mkdir(at)	File	Y	Y	Y
rmdir	File	Y	Y	Y
unlink(at)	File	Y	Y	Y
symlink(at)	File	Y	Y	Y
chmod/fchmod(at)	File	Y	Y	Y
creat	File	Y	Y	Y

Exploit Requirements

- Exploitation requirements
  - No additional privilege and capabilities
  - Control the time to inject the delay
  - Enough delay for pointer overwrite
  - Reliable

Exploit Strategy 1 (DEFCON 29)

- Injected delay is small
- Requires Userfaultfd syscall for precise injection while pausing the kernel execution
- seccomp can block userfaultfd syscall (e.g., docker default seccomp profile)
- Falco's mitigation was to detect userfaultfd



Phantom Attack: Evading System Call Monitoring, DEFCON 29. https://github.com/rexguowork/phantom-attack

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Exploit Strategy 2

- Injected delay >> the syscall execution time
- No Precise control is required



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Syscall Built-in Delay

- Attackers can trigger significant syscall delays by introducing:
  - Blocking conditions (attack sys_exit)
  - Seccomp rules (attack sys_enter)
- Syscall can get “blocked”

Categories	**Syscalls**
Process	fork/exec/exit/wait/…
File system	open(at)/symlink(at)/read/write/…
Networking	connect/accept/socket/…
Security	seccomp/keyctl/…
Many others…	…

Connect Syscall



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Bypassing Connect Syscall Tracing (Demo)



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Blocking Syscalls (File Systems)

- File system syscalls are all affected
  - open/openat
  - creat
  - rename/renameat/renameat2
  - mkdir/mkdirat
  - rmdir
  - Other file system syscalls with pointer arguments
- Other syscalls are also affected due to fetching files from file systems.
  - execve/execveat

Filesystem in USErspace - FUSE

- User space filesystem framework
- Used as remote storage FUSE
  - Access the remote files as local ones
  - Faster evolvement and don’t panic the kernel etc.
- Remote storage FUSE examples:
  - gcsfuse[1] : developed by Google for GCS
  - s3fs-fuse[2]: Amazon S3
  - BlobFuse[3]: developed by Azure for Blob storage
  - MezzFS[4]: developed and deployed @ Netflix
  - Many others (sshfs etc.)

1, https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/gcsfuse
2, https://github.com/s3fs-fuse/s3fs-fuse
3, https://github.com/Azure/azure-storage-fuse
4, https://netflixtechblog.com/mezzfs-mounting-object-storage-in-netflixs-media-processing-platform-cda01c446ba

Remote Storage FUSE - Architecture



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Bypassing Openat Tracing (Demo)



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TOCTOU – sys_enter (Connect)



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Seccomp Introduction

- Kernel level mechanism to restrict syscalls
- Modern sandboxes heavily relies on seccomp
- Developers can write rules to:
  - allow/block certain syscalls
  - allow/block syscalls based on argument values
- These rules can be quite complex (read more)
  - More rules takes more time to compute
- First inserted rules are evaluated last

Attacking Syscall Enter



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ptrace + seccomp redirect

- Tracer starts App



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Exploitation and Mitigations

Tracing location	TOCTOU Exploitation	Mitigations
ptrace @ sys_enter	Seccomp filter insertion	- ptrace + seccomp redirect to start the app. - Inspect seccomp filters already inserted when attaching to a running app
tracepoint @ sys_enter	Unreliable	N/A
tracepoint @ sys_exit	- Blocking syscall (This talk) - Phantom attack v1 (DEFCON 29)	- Compare tracepoint sys_enter and sys_exit args
ptrace @ sys_exit	Same as above	- Deploy all mitigations for ptrace @ sys_enter - Compared the sys_enter and sys_exit syscall args
kprobe @ kernel internal	It depends	Read the kernel copy of the syscall args - LSM (BPF-LSM) - Other interfaces

Key Takeaways

1. Linux kernel tracing can be bypassed reliably
   - Check your security tools
2. Mitigation is complex (workload type and kernel compatibility)
   - Check your security tools' mitigation claims
3. Correlate different data sources
4. Know your normal

- Discussing further?
  - @Xiaofei_REX / rex.guo *NOSPAM* lacework DOT com
  - jzeng04 *NOSPAM* gmail DOT com
  - POC: https://github.com/rexguowork/phantom-attack

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Acknowledgement

- Joel Schopp (Linux kernel / Security)
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  - Michael Clark
  - Michele Zuccala
  - Luca Guerra
- John Dickson

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